Paul Fussell was an English Literature professor at Rutgers and Penn State. His advanced degree came from publishing and discussing poetry written from the trenches of the first world war. The writers were English, and he had to dive deep to get those poems from the British Government’s archived materials.
Fussell in turn, also fought in France in the closing year of World War II; his writing regarding this experience pointed out two things: The bureaucracy that was the US Army was disdained by most who served. He was wounded in the war and noted that coming home, physically intact, his mind would still wander when driving around town—as in sorting out the best place to emplace a machine gun as a defensive measure…….
The Boys Crusade is an antiwar history. He is unapologetic about that. For those of us having experienced the traumas of Vietnam, whether in the service or not, there is a tendency to think, as our parents did, of World War II as the, “good war.” He defines this as. military romanticism which was rampant after the war. The case is made that for infantrymen, it was never considered as such. He worries that this homage raises unrealistic views; his counter: “There is nothing in infantry warfare to raise the spirits at all and anyone who imagines a military “victory” gratifying is mistaken.”
The numbers: For the USA, World War II saw 135,000 servicemen die and another 586,628 wounded. 70% of those numbers come from infantry services which comprised only 14% of the total military manpower of those years. He points out that they were often reluctant and usually very young draftees fighting one of the most prepared and experienced armies on the planet.
There was a division within our army as there was in other armies—that between the officer corps and the enlisted. Eisenhower wrote a letter to the troops with June 6 eminent; in it he references the word, “crusade” and would later write a memoir, Crusade in Europe. This likely reflected his education which would have referenced the crusades of the middle ages and the image he wanted to confer was a cause larger than any one of us—a Holy one at that—and a group effort to be sure. Most enlisted men would not have read this letter but would have had it read to them as the pressure built. Most would have considered the language, “highfalutin…….”
These kids that populated the infantry divisions were largely 17-19 years old. At aid stations, they were referred to as “boys” because to the older doctors and nurses caring for them, there was no other word to use. One such boy is quoted, noting that in training, “We aimed, thrust, slashed, or whichever, screaming, ‘Kill! Kill!’ In our teen age voices.”
Regardless of age or rank they believed in certain things:
America was the best of all countries and the only really modern one.
Making lots of industrial things in quantity was going to win this war. Our stuff was better than theirs’. With time, they would modify this as the German machine gun’s superiority was clear to them in the field and Sherman Tanks would assume the nickname, “Ronsons” —-after the cigarette lighter of the time. Both caught fire readily.
The US Army was the best at getting clothes, food, lodging, weapons, and other securities to the troops in the field.
The enlisted hated officers. They all hated the French for their military failures over the twentieth century, and any unit whose function was behind the lines: artillery, engineers, and so on.
The British and American armies co-habited in England the two years before D Day and they had natural antagonisms: The English appreciate understatement and irony—foreign to your average American teen, to this day. The British private pulled $2.82 a week in pay whereas the American equivalent made $13.84. The English second lieutenant made $67.42 a week and the American, $162.50. Liberty saw this differential compound itself in behavior and the ability to attract women to the party. London city did not segregate by race and suddenly American troops were telling pub proprietors that they could not serve soldiers of color. Riots occurred over this issue. One British witness: “I don’t mind the Yanks but can’t say I care for these white chaps the have brought with them.”
A new word was invented: “Sloppery.” This referred to the famously causal enlisted men who did not provide a spit and polish image—-“They do not wear uniforms but overalls…combinations of high trousers and blouse all gray-green…the steel helmet is worn comfortably as a hat, pushed forward or back, as it suits them.” Ernie Pyle noted, “…Our boys sing in the streets, unbutton their shirt collars, laugh, and shout, and forget to salute.” Fussell suggests that there was no, “forgetting.” This was an act of refusal……..
The war itself finally arrived. The Allies successfully tricked the Germans into thinking we would invade at Calais. A “fake army” was deployed in England, across the channel with blow up tanks and planes as well as radio traffic making the case that General Patton was ready to lead the invasion. This strategy worked as German troops were held after the Normandy invasion, so sure were they knew where the real target would be. They were convinced in part by the horrific bombing of Northern France’s infrastructure in the Calais region with many thousands of native French civilians dying in the process. The German High Command did not think our leadership so ruthless as to sacrifice so many innocents for a ruse.
FUBAR was real: the breakout in Northern France at St Lo required a new bombing tactic: saturation bombing of a 6 kilometer square area. The third time was a charm, allowing the US forces to get behind German lines but first, hundreds of American troops were blown to bits, including a general, all owing to the lack of instruction and coordination between ground troops and the bomber pilots. He allows that that sort of event happens in war and that people learned from it—but faults that fact that no one really ever was told and all those soldiers had relatives receiving a telegram that noted, “died while serving his country.”
Hürtgen Forrest: In November of 1944, division after division was used to try and conquer a forested area on the border of Germany and France. This forest took away all the American’s natural advantages: air support, mobile armor, and artillery. The defenders were experienced. On the American side, young officers and their troops died in large numbers (120,000 fought for the US here and 33,000 were killed or wounded). This was the site of many desertions that led to firing squads and loss of moral.
The loss of so many casualties as the front was otherwise moving East led to a manpower shortage: Americans who had been promised training as pilots or deferred draft status were suddenly sent to be infantrymen and they were reluctant to say the least …).
American military managers had an education in part based on the experience of business in America the first half of the twentieth century (again, the most modern and best country in the world). There were principles based on science as they were understood then with a goal of efficiency. There was in this war, great learning about the psychology of men in stressful situations that had few parallels in business. “It took most of the ground war for leaders to realize that the threat of shame and contempt before an audience of valued intimate acquaintances was more powerful than patriotism or ideology or hatred of the enemy in extracting untowardly behavior from soldiers.” Not only that, increased casualty rates were found with inadequately trained new soldiers now incorporated with a group of strangers. New recruits were often selected to lead point, the most dangerous position for an army on the offense. How did this idea arise in inserting infantrymen singly as strangers into experienced units? It would only make sense to someone trained in business methods……although the replacement system made good bureaucratic sense and promoted efficient management, it is hard to imagine a system more detrimental to the individual soldier’s discipline, morale, and training.”
The Battle of the Bulge: known to us for, “Nuts” as the response to the German call to surrender and the heroics of the 101st division— this battle saw divisions of green soldiers massacred or retreating. In one month, 19,000 such soldiers died here and 21,000 were captured.
If the word, “crusade” was an abstract term from the ranks of generals, the infantryman’s introduction to German Work Camps polarized their thinking and motivation. Crusade made sense—the soldiers, as irritated by their leadership and bureaucracy as they were, found themselves truly moved by the cruelty they saw in these camps. The romanticism of that war and the crusade to rid the world of evil was born anew.
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